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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Criminal Law-Confessions*
Three youths, who were sought for murder and attempted robbery
in North Carolina, were located in a Virginia jail by North Carolina
county officers and representatives of the State Bureau of Investigation.
The boys were questioned several times; and twelve days after they had
been found, they confessed in the presence of a dozen officers and wit-
nesses from North Carolina, including the solicitor of the twelfth judicial
district. At the voir dire the youths testified that they were induced to
confess by the statements of the solicitor that ". . . he was going to put
this bill of indictment for second degree murder which carried a penalty
of 25-30 years in our home state and at most, in all probability, we
* Supplementing Coates, Limitations on Investigating Officers (1937) 15 N. C.
L. REv. 229 at 233-236.
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would be out in five years... ."- The officers denied having made any
offers or inducements, and the solicitor stated that he went to Virginia
purposely to insure that no unfair methods were employed in gaining
information. A State Bureau of Investigation agent testified that part
of his "scheme" was to tell the boys that under the law of Virginia
they were liable to the death penalty; and in reply to queries from the
youths about the first and second degree murder charges, he answered
that a first degree charge would be drawn and what would happen
to them would be left to the jury and the court. It was further testified
that another State Bureau of Investigation agent told the boys ". . . I
can't understand why an intelligent young man like you, can't see the
difference in twenty-five to thirty years in your home sta.te and life im-
prisonment at the best in another state than your own."' 2  The trial
judge asked the prosecuting counsel if they could explain why these
young men, after continually stating that they had nothing to say, should
suddenly say ". . . I want to make a statement that will hang me,
' 3
but no explanation was offered. The trial court, nevertheless, ruled
that the confession was voluntary, and the boys were convicted of first
degree murder. On appeal to the Supreme Court, in a four to three
decision, it was held that the confessions were involuntarily gained and
were improperly admitted in evidence.
In this discussion the role of confessions in the law of evidence
will be developed in the following manner: (1) The value of confes-
sions; (2) voluntary confessions; (3) involuntary confessions; (4) sec-
ond confessions; (5) confessions of third parties; (6) evidence uicov-
ered by involuntary confessions and (7) procedural problems.
THE VALuE OF CONFESSIONS
In 1797 the Supreme Court refused to uphold a conviction for the
capital crime of horse stealing based upon a voluntary confession which
was the sole evidence, and it was stated that: "A confession, from the
very nature of the thing, is a very doubtful species of evidence, and to
be received with great caution. It is hardly to be supposed that a man
perfectly possessed of himself, would make a confession to take away his
own life. ' 4 However, voluntary confessions were accepted as corrob-
orative evidence, and in 1847 the court in State v. Cowan5 shifted to the
view that a prisoner could be convicted of a capital crime upon his own
unbiased and voluntary confession without any other evidence.
VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
Throughout all the cases the idea has been reiterated that a free
1 State v. Biggs, 224 N. C. 23, 29 S. E. (2d) 121, 122 (1944).
2 Id. at 26, 29 S. E. (2d) at 122.
'Ibid. " State v. Long, 2 N. C. 456 (1797).
'29 N. C. 239 (1847) ; accord, State v. Hardee, 83 N. C. 619 (1880).
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and voluntary statement deserved the highest credit because it was pre-
sumed to flow from a strong sense of guilt, but that any statement
wrung from the mind by the flattery of hope or torture of fear or
promise of reward would merit no consideration since it was the least
reliable statement of all.
In determining whether a confession has been given voluntarily
there have been several well-established principles laid down. The mere
fact that the accused is under arrest,0 in the custody of officers, or in
jail8 at the time of the alleged confession has been held not to invalidate
the confession. Nor do officers have to take the caution to advise the
accused of his right not to speak, as required by the statute when
accused is examined by a magistrate,0 as a condition precedent to the
acceptance as voluntary any statement made by an accused; that statute
being applicable only to preliminary examinations before magistrates.' 0
Furthermore, the fact that the officers were armed when the confession
was made has been held not to invalidate it,11 and the case is even
stronger where the accused made fun of the arms by calling them "pop
guns.' 2  Although the prisoner had been wounded by the officers who
had him in custody and to whom he made the confession, it was held
voluntary upon the showing that on the journey to jail the officers
treated him kindly and he had no subsequent fear of them.' 3 In State
v. Bridges4 the accused was arrested, handcuffed, and being driven to
jail in an automobile when an officer suddenly turned around, turned a
flashlight into the prisoner's face and asked why he had committed the
murder. The reply was held to be a voluntary confession. Two other
' State v. Smoak, 213 N. C. 79, 195 S. E. 72 (1937) ; State v. Jones, 203 N. C.
374, 166 S. E. 163 (1932) ; State v. Bowden, 175 N. C. 794, 95 S. E. 145 (1918) ;
State v. Christy, 170 N. C. 772, 72 S. E. 499 (1915) ; State v. Cooper, 170 N. C.
719, 87 S. E. 50 (1915); State v. Lance, 166 N. C. 411, 81 S. E. 1092 (1914) ;
State v. Drakeford, 162 N. C. 667, 78 S. E. 308 (1913); State v. Wright and
Harriston, 61 N. C. 486 (1868) ; State v. Gregory, 50 N. C. 315 (1858) ; State v.
Scates, 50 N. C. 420 (1858) ; State v. Jefferson, 28 N. C. 305 (1846).
' State v. Tate, 210 N. C. 613, 188 S. E. 91 (1936) ; State v. Stefanoff, 206 N.
C. 443, 174 S. E. 411 (1934) ; State v. Grier, 203 N. C. 586, 166 S. E. 387 (1932);
State v. Gray, 192 N. C. 594. 135 S. E. 535 (1926).
'State v. Wagstaff, 219 N. C. 15, 12 S. E. (2d) 657 (1940) ; State v. Jones,
145 N. C. 466, 59 S. E. 353 (1907) ; State v. Bohanon, 142 N. C. 695, 55 S. E.
797 (1906) ; State v. Exun, 138 N. C. 600, 50 S. E. 283 (1905) ; State v. Flem-
nuing, 130 N. C. 688, 41 S. E. 549 (1902).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §15-89: "The magistrate shall then proceed to
examine the prisoner in relation to the offense charged. Such examination shall
not be on oath; and before it is commenced, the prisoner shall be informed by the
magistrate of the charge made against him, and that he is at liberty to refuse to
answer any question that may be put to him, and that his refusal to answer shall
not be used to his prejudice in any stage of the proceedings.".
10 State v. Gross, 223 N. C. 31. 25 S. E. (2d) 193 (1943).
x State v. Caldwell, 212 N. :. 484, 193 S. E. 716 (1937).
12 State v. De Graff, 113 N. C. 688, 18 S. E. 507 (1893).
1 State v. Homer, 139 N. C. 603, 52 S. E. 136 (1905).
1178 N. C. 733, 101 S. E. 29 (1919); cf. State v. Exum, 213 N. C. 16, 195
S. E. 7 (1937).
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interesting variations are found in State v. Coily'5 where the defendant
was found hiding under his bed, and when told by a police officer that
a certain man was dead, voluntarily stated that he "aimed" to kill him;
and State v. Jones"8 where the defendant, while running down the street
carrying a gun, was chased by a policeman who asked him why he had
shot his wife. The confession made under those circumstances was
held to be voluntary.
The addition of handcuffs' 7 or tying of hands, if tying is not pain-
ful,' 8 to the fact of arrest does not make the confession involuntary.
In State v. Rodgers'0 the accused was tied during his appearance before
a magistrate, and it was held that this was not sufficient to cause the
confession to be involuntary, although the court censured this practice
before a magistrate.
Crowds assembled about the place where the prisoner is being de-
tained. If it has been shown that the prisoner heard none of the threats
being made,20 or if the officer in charge placed himself between the
crowd and the prisoner and the confession was not made until a sub-
sequent day,21 is held not to be a fact which would invalidate the con-
fession. In State v. Daniels22 a crowd was assembled at the train from
which the prisoner stepped. When the prisoner showed great fear and
asked the sheriff not to let the crowd hurt him, the sheriff verbally re-
assured his safety and asked the circumstances of the crime; whereupon,
the prisoner confessed: The ruling that this confession was voluntary
appears to have entirely overlooked both the state's and defendant's
testimony.
Statements made to an officer in resnonse to his exhortation for the
prisoner to "... tell the truth,' 23 or "... if you want to go ahead-
tell me the truth, I will appreciate it"24 or ... this is a very serious
matter, and I presume you know what it is about. It is about this man
that has been hit at the warehouse" 25 have been held voluntary. Inter-
qsting cases involving exhortatory statements which produced confes-
sions are State v. Hudson,28 where a witness told the defendant to keep
his mouth shut and pray, and to the contrary, the defendant confessed,
1r130 N. C. 683, 41 S. E. 534 (1902).
10 145 N. C. 466, 59 S. E. 353 (1907).
17 State v. Whitfield, 109 N. C. 876, 13 S. E. 726 (1891) ; State v. Bishop, 98
N. C. 773. 4 S. E. 357 (1887).
8 State V. Cruse, 74 N. C. 491 (1876).
10 112 N. C. 874, 17 S. E. 297 (1893).
20 State v. Efler, 85 N. C. 585 (1881).
1 State v. Vann, 82 N. C. 631 (1880).
22134 N. C. 641, 46 S. E. 743 (1904).
2 State v. Myers, 202 N. C. 351, 353, 162 S. E. 764. 765 (1932).
", State v. Thompson, 224 N. C. 661, 664, - S. E. (2d) - (1944).
" State v. Murray, 216 N. C. 681, 683. 6 S. E. (2d) 513, 514 (1939).20 218 N. C. 218. 10 S. E. (2d) 730 (1940).
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and State v. Patrick.27 In the latter case a slave was forced by a wit-
ness to fit his shoe into a track, and then the witness said, ". . . you
might as well tell all about it ... for I am satisfied . . . if you belonged
to me, I would make you tell." A short time later the slave called the
witness aside and confessed; and the court, in holding the confession
voluntary, strangely enough said that the statement of the witness, "if
you belonged to me I would make you tell," carried with it the assurance
that the witness would inflict no suffering upon the defendant. An
unusual interpretation is to be found in State v. Hawkin,28 where the
sheriff told a prisoner that he was on the sp6t and that the only way out
was to plead insanity, to which the prisoner replied that he would never
do it. The court here said that if the statement made by the sheriff
were an accusation, then the words replied by the prisoner were not an
admission; and that if the answer could be interpreted as a confession,
it was voluntary and therefore admissible in evidence.
The fact that prior to the confession the prisoner was shown cloth-
ing which the accuser had said her attacker wore, and that subsequent
to such showing the defendant confessed has been held not to invalidate
a confession.2 9 In State v. Saunders,30 a former slave, while tied, was
carried to the accuser's house. There, in the presence of five white
men, he was confronted with the clothing he had supposedly stolen and
was asked where he got them. The court upheld the decision of the
trial court that this was a voluntary confession; but, under the facts as
stated, it is difficult to understand on what basis this decision was made.
Mistaken belief was not sufficient reason to cause confession to be
involuntary where a prisoner confessed to rape without knowing that
the penalty for the crime to which he had confessed was hanging ;3 or
where the confession was gained by talk made to a cell-mate who prom-
ised not to tell and who assured the defendant that one criminal could
not testify against another.3 2  However, this type of holding appears
unjust in the case where an aged and sick woman was induced to con-
fess, to the procurement of an agent to murder her husband, by the
words of a private detective that he was a right good old "monger doc-
tor" who could "work roots" and "gummer folks," and he would give
her something so that she wouldn't get caught if she would tell him
about it.3 3 The court's reasoning that the promise to protect by witch-
ery, although it was an artifice resorted to in order to ascertain the
truth, offered no temptation in the contemplation of law, to an innocent
'48 N. C. 443, 448 (1856).
28 214 N. C. 326, 199 S. E. 284 (1938).
" State v. Smith, 213 N. C. 299, 195 S. E. 819 (1938).
"0 84 N. C. 729 (1881).
" State v. Jefferson, 28 N. C. 305 (1846).
"State v. Mitchell. 61 N. C. 447 (1868).
"3 State v. Harrison, 115 N. C. 706, 20 S. E. 175 (1894).
[Vol. 23
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person to pretend that he was guilty, might be legalistically sound; but
at the same time it leaves the impression that the confession would
never have been gained without this underhanded method of induce-
ment. Equally difficult to understand is the decision that a confession,
induced by the promise of a girl to marry the accused if he confessed to
the arson, was voluntary because the promise did not have any reference
to the prisoner's escape from the criminal charge but was merely a
collateral boon. Furthermore, it was shown that the promise was made
by the girl in order to receive $50 offered to her if she could obtain the
defendant's confession.34
Voluntary confessions may be obtained against the maker under cir-
cumstances when he was not aware of the possible consequences of his
statements. In State v. Chisenhal35 a statement made before a solicitor
by a witness, against whom no charge was pending, in reference to an
offense committed by another, was received in evidence against the
maker when subsequently indicted for the same offense. Testimony
given by an accuser in swearing out a warrant for assault and battery
was later accepted as evidence against him in a trial for adultery insti-
gated by the person whom he had accused of the assault and battery.30
INvOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
On the other hand there are a number of instances where confes-
sions have been held to be involuntary. In State v. Davis3 7 an officer,
after arresting the defendant, told him that he had worked up the case
and that the defendant might as well tell all about it. Here it was ruled
that the statements were calculated to agitate the mind of the defendant,
an ignorant man, and that an officer discharged his duty by simply mak-
ing an arrest, it being no part of his duties to provoke a prisoner into
making any statements. A clear illustration of the circumstances which
have caused a confession to be involuntary is where armed captors kept
the accused in the woods twelve miles from town and subjected him to
persistent questioning instead of taking him to jail.3 8
Although mere handcuffing or tying has not been a fact rendering a
confession involuntary, where the bound defendant is lashed until he
confesses ;39 or where one defendant who is bound, sees another lashed,
and he confesses to forestall equal treatment,40 the confessions have
been held involuntary.
The simple fact that crowds surrounded the accused has not justified
" State v. Hardee, 83 N. C. 619 (1880).
3t 106 N. C. 676, 11 S. E. 518 (1890).
"' State v. Simpson, 133 N. C. 676, 45 S. E. 567 (1903).
' 125 N. C. 612, 34 S. E. 198 (1899).
38 State v. Dildy, 72 N. C. 325 (1875).
"State v. Fisher, 51 N. C. 478 (1859).,State v. Lawson. 61 N. C. 47 (1866).
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the holding of a confession to be involuntary; but the addition of the
facts, that one defendant saw another struck and threatened; and he
was told to confess or be hanged, 41 did justify holding a confession in-
voluntary. The same result was reached where the crowds uttered
threats of violence which the defendant heard ;42 and where crowds
surged around an unprotected defendant and told him that if he would
get out of the state, they would not mob him.
43
Exhortatory statements that have produced involuntary confession
are clearly illustrated in State v. Whitfield.4 4 Where a colored man
was confronted by his white boss and several other white men, the boss
saying ". . . I believe you are guilty; if you are, you had better say so;
... if you are not, you had better say that.... ." The threats here were
also accompanied by menacing gestures. Other examples are where the
accused was promised that he would "get off lighter" if he confessed,48
and where the defendant's statements were made under the influence of
liquor after he had been falsely told that others had confessed.40
An extraordinary situation is to be found in State v. Brittain.4 7 A
husband forced his wife to confess to incest with her father on the
threat of leaving her. This is perhaps one of the most unusual cases
of fear causing an involuntary confession, and it is somewhat contra to
the views of State v. Harrison48 and State v. Hardee4 9-that the influ-
ence exerted must bear some relation to the criminal charge.
A confession can be affected by acts as well as words. When five
men accosted the defendant and urged her to tell the truth about what
she had done with her child, her act of leading them to the river was
held to be an involuntary confession.50
There are conflicting decisions on whether a denial may be intro-
duced in evidence. In State v. McDowell0 ' the defendant, while lying
in bed, was confronted by four armed officers who accused him of mur-
der, which accusation the defendant denied. The defendant objected to
this statement being introduced in the trial court, and on appeal it was
held that this was not a confession at all; and that, although the state-
ment might have been induced by fear, it was admissible in evidence.
But where the defendant was forced to listen to the reading of the
affidavits of other defendants which incriminated him, and he remained
," State v. George, 50 N. C. 233 (1858).
Is State v. Lowry, 170 N. C. 730, 87 S. E. 62 (1915).
"State v. Parish, 78 N. C. 492 (1878).
"70 N. C. 356, 357 (1874).
'State v. Drake, 113 N. C. 624, 18 S. E. 166 (1893).
48 State v. Anderson, 208 N. C. 771, 182 S. E. 643 (1935).
'1 117 N. C. 783, 23 S. E. 433 (1895).
I8 115 N. C. 706, 20 S. E. 175 (1894).
"83 N. C. 619 (1880).
50 State v. Crowson, 98 N. C. 595. 4 S. E. 143 (1887).
"129 N. C. 523, 39 S. E. 840 (1901).
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silent, the court refused to allow the introduction of his silence during
the reading as evidence on the basis that if this silence could be con-
strued as a confession it was involuntarily made."
In the light of the discussion of the cases involving voluntary and
involuntary confessions it is difficult to understand the views of the
dissent in the principal case. The majority decision was founded on
the testimony of both the state's and the defense's witnesses that a
lighter penalty would be exacted in North Carolina; that one of the
cross-examiners made his statements as part of a "scheme"; and that
youthful defendants would not know enough about criminal procedure
to ask the type of questions he asked unless he had been influenced by
previous statements of the examiners. The dissent apparently based its
opinion on the conflicting testimony of some of the state's witnesses in
regard to some of the statements that were credited to them and thought
that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's opinion
that the confession was voluntary.
SECOND CONFESSIONS
Another phase of this problem is second confessions. Subsequent
confessions involving the same crime are presumed to flow from the
same inducement that caused the first involuntary confession. Unless
there has been a sufficient showing of facts to rebut the inference that
the second confession was dominated by the same influence, the second
confession will fail equally with the first.53 The question of when suffi-
cient evidence has been introduced to rebut that presumption has pro-
duced interesting situations. An outstanding example of the refutation
of the previously d6minating influence is found in State v. Fisher.54 The
first confession was gained by the cruel beating of the defendant while
he was chained; but the second confession, given while the defendant
was in jail, was made in order to extenuate the defendant's offense in
the estimation of his friend. Equally strong is the case where the first
confession was obtained through fear of a Georgia lynching gang, and
the second confession was made in North Carolina to a fortune teller
and a fellow prisoner several days later.55 State v. Moore56 presents a
decision that apparently was not justified by the facts. Here the first
confession was prompted by the sheriff's promise to "let the defendant
off lighter." Subsequently the defendant told a psychiatrist the same
story without any inducement on the part of the doctor; but the de-
fendant, according to testimony, labored under the idea that the sheriff
had sent the psychiatrist and that he must tell coinciding stories in order
2 State v. Dill, 208 N. C. 313. 180 S. E. 571 (1935).
= State v. Fox, 197 N. C. 478, 149 S. E. 735 (1929).
'51 N. C. 478 (1859).
= State v. Lowry, 170 N. C. 730, 87 S. E. 62 (1915)."'210 N. C. 686, 188 S. E. 421 (1936).
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to gain the sheriff's aid. Yet this second confession was held to be
voluntary. A confusing situation is revealed in State v. Grier.7 In
the trial court the first confession was discarded because the statements
had been made by the defendant while in jail before officers, none of
whom had cautioned him as required by statute.58 The second confes-
sion, made to the same officers was accepted by the trial court; and the
defendant appealed, contending that the second confession was induced
by the same influence as the first. The Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's decision in regard to the second confession; while at the same
time it trounced the decision by pointing out that the first confession
was equally sufficient, since the only basis on which it had been ruled
out was the lack of the statutory caution which is required before magis-
trates and not officers. Another unusual fact situation is found in State
v. Gregory59 where the defendant was induced by an examining magis-
trate to confess on promise of a pardon. The magistrate then ap-
proached the defendant and told him that he had acted improperly and
that the confession was illegal; furthermore, he warned the defendant
that any subsequent statement would be used against him, after which
the defendant confessed to another witness. This second confession
was held voluntary. In State v. Godwin ° the trial court ruled out the
first confession as involuntary, but accepted a second confession. The
defendant appealed contending that the confession which had been ad-
mitted was the first one that he had made and not the second, and that
both were involuntary; but the Supreme Court ruled that the finding of
the trial court if supported by evidence was conclusive.
Similarly, there are cases where the second confession has been re-
jected as being dominated by the same influence as the first. Where the
defendant has been promised a lighter sentence,01 and where he was
promised no prosecution at all if he would tell the truth,0 2 the second
confessions were rejected equally with the first when there bad been no
evidence that the inducements had been withdrawn. It is to be noted
that in the latter of these examples the second confession was made
before a person other than the one to whom the first had been made;
yet in absence of evidence showing that the prior inducement no longer
existed, the court held that the second confession was inadmissible. A
strong example of the second confession being dominated by the prior
influence is shown in the case where a colored man was pursued by sev-
eral officers who shot at him a number of times while attempting arrest.
5 203 N. C. 586, 166 S. E. 595 (1932).
8 See note 9 supra.
S50 N. C. 315 (1858) ; cf. State v. Needham, 78 N. C. 474 (1878).
60 216 N. C. 49, 3 S. E. (2d) 347 (1939).
" State v. Gibson, 216 N. C. 535, 5 S. E. (2d) 717 (1939) ; State v. Drake,
113 N. C. 625. 18 S. E. 166 (1893) ; State v. Roberts, 12 N. C. 259 (1827).
2 State v. Lowhorne, 66 N. C. 638 (1872).
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When he was caught, he confessed. The second confession was made
before the same officers on the next day while the accused was hand-
cuffed and in jail. This second confession was also held involuntary.63
In State v. Stevenson64 the first confession was made to an officer who
had told the accused that: ". . . there is no use you beginning to lie
to me this morning. I have already too much evidence to convict you.
We are going to take you down there." After the confession, the ac-
cused was taken to a doctor to have his arm wound treated, whereupon
he confessed again. The defendant testified that he had been afraid of
lynching, and the court held that the fear instigated by the officer's re-
marks influenced the second as well as the first confession. This same
result was reached in the case where a woman had been forced into con-
fessing to incest by the threat of her husband to leave her where the
second confession was made to her family in the presence of her hus-
band who had not withdrawn his threat.65
THiRD PARTY CONFESSIONS
A perplexing problem is presented by the introduction of the con-
fessions of third parties to vindicate the defendant. The original case
in that line is State v. May.66 The defendant offered evidence of the
confession of a third party that he alone was guilty of the crime of
which the defendant was accused, but this evidence was rejected as
hearsay. This harsh rule has been consistently followed,6 7 and the court
in State v. English8 adequately expressed the criticism of this line of
authority by saying: "Almost every judge who has had to lay down the
law in cases like this does not like it .... It may seem absurd to one
not accustomed to compare proofs, and estimate the weight of testimony
according to the test of veracity that an unbiased confession of one
man that he is guilty of an offense with which another is charged, should
not establish the guilt of him who confesses it, and by consequence, the
innocence of th6 other, but the law must proceed on general principles."
EVIDENCE UNCOVERED BY INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
This discussion is not complete without mention of evidence gained
through involuntary confessions. Although the confession itself is in-
voluntary, evidence revealed by such confession has always been admis-
sible.69 Examples of this are wnere an accused murderer revealed the
State v. Drake, 82 N. C. 592 (1880).64212 N. C. 648, 649, 194 S. E. 81 (1937).
sL State v. Brittain, 117 N. C. 783, 23 S. E. 433 (1895).
0615 N. C. 328 (1833).
s State v. Church, 192 N. C. 658, 135 S. E. 769 (1926).0-8201 N. C. 295, 299, 159 S. E. 318, 319 (1931); Note (1931) 10 N. C. L.
REv. 84.
"' State v. Thompson, 161 N. C. 242, 76 S. E. 243 (1912); State v. Mallet,
125 N. C. 718, 34 S. E. 651 (1899) ; State v. Winston, 116 N. C. 992, 21 S. E.
106 (1895).
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hiding place of the bloody murder club to officers ;70 where accused
thieves revealed the hiding places of stolen property in a garden 7' and
in the woods;72 and where a person suspected of larcency, revealed
where the stolen money, saddle bags and clothing were concealed. 78
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
When a confession is accepted in evidence, the entire confession
must be brought in.74 The part favorable to the defendant as well as
the part unfavorable must be admitted. In State v. Worthington
75
evidence was offered of part of a conversation between the alleged thief
and the owner of the stolen goods, and the defendant objected to the
omission of the rest of. the conversation. His appeal was successful,
and the court stated that this admission of the confession in its totality
was not the situation where the defendant might be held to be manufac-
turing evidence for himself. Likewise, where a confession revealed that
the defendant was drunk at the time he committed the crime, and the
trial judge charged the jury that the evidence offered by the defendant
in his own behalf must be taken "with a grain of salt," the court on
appeal ruled that the charge was error. Since the defendant was en-
titled to have the whole confession offered, the evidence of drunkenness
was for the jury to consider on the question of the deliberation and
premeditation in the murder indictment.
70
All confessions are presumed to be voluntary until or unless they
are controverted by the defendant,77 and the voluntariness is for the
trial court to determine at the voir dire.78 Confessions may be either
express or implied. An express confession is where the defendant
-pleads guilty and thus in the face of the court admits the truth of the
accusation. This plea of guilty equals a conviction, and the court then
has nothing to do but decree judgment in this formal confession. But
a full and voluntary confession made before a magistrate or any other
person is merely evidence of guilt.79 In the preliminary hearing before
the trial court, the voir dire, the defendant has the right to ask that
the jury be withdrawn, to cross-examine the state's witnesses, and to
present his own evidence as to the incompetency of the confession."0 In
the presentation of the defendant's evidence it has been held error for
the trial judge to refuse to allow the defendant to testify as to his ver-
¢o State v. Lowry, 170 N. C. 730. 87 S. E. 62 (1915).
71 State v. Winston, 116 N. C. 992, 21 S. E. 106 (1895).
72 State v. Lindgey, 78 N. C. 499 (1878).
7 State v. Moore, 2 N. C. 482 (1797).
' State v. Kelly, 216 N. C. 627, 6 S. E. (2d) 533 (1939).
7r 64 N. C. 594 (1870).
" State v. Edwards, 211 N. C. 555, 191 S. E. 1 (1937).
7 State v. Richardson, 216 N. C. 304. 4 S. E. (2d) 852 (1939).
State v. Rodgers, 216 N. C. 731. 6 S. E. (2d) 499 (1939).
State v. Branner. 149 N. C. 559, 63 S. E. 169 (1908).
s State v. Smith. 213 N. C. 299. 195 S. E. 819 (1938).
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sion of the confession."' Since the defendant has a right to offer evi-
dence that the confession was not voluntary, and since by statute 2 a
defendant has the right to testify in his own behalf at his request, he
is competent to testify in regard to the voluntariness of his own con-
fession; and the judge should then pass on the credibility of his testi-
mony. If the defendant fails to offer any evidence at the voir dire to
show that the confession is involuntary, he waives this right; and his
testimony given at trial tending to show that the confession is involun-
tary comes too late to be considered.8 3 However, if the defendant
waives his right to controvert the voluntariness of the confession and
on trial it is subsequently revealed from the evidence of the state's wit-
nesses that the confession is not voluntary, it is admissible at that
point.8 4
What facts amount to such threats or promises as to exclude con-
fessions as not voluntary are questions of law. 5 Whether there is any
evidence tending to show that the confession is not voluntary is a ques-
tion of law which is reviewable 8 6  But whether the evidence, if true,
proves the facts, or whether the witnesses giving testimony in regard to
facts are credible or not, or in the case of conflict of testimony, which
witness should be believed, are questions of fact which cannot be re-
viewed8 7 tnless there is not sufficient evidence to support the jury's
finding.
8
Instructions can be given to the jury by the judge that even volun-
tary confessions are to be received with caution, but this is not re-
quired.8 9 It is not error to refuse to charge that confessions are to be
received with caution, and still less so, when the court is not asked to
give the instructions.0 0 The jury alone has the right to judge the suffi-
ciency of the confession as proving the fact confessed,91 and they may
believe the confession in part, in toto, or not at all.92 In State v. Hardi-
soIZ,93 a charge that it was for the jury, having regard to all the evidence,
to say what portions of the defendant's statements they would receive
and what they would reject in their sound discretion, was upheld.
IDRIENNE E. LEvY.*
81 State v. Whitner, 191 N. C. 659, 132 S. E. 603 (1926).
82 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §8-54.
:' State v. Alston, 215 N. C. 713, 3 S. E. (2d) 11 (1939).
8' State v. Gibson, 216 N. C. 535. 5 S. E. (2d) 717 (1939) ; State v. Anderson,
208 N. C. 771. 182 S. E 643 (1935)
a State v Andrews, 61 N. C. 205 (1867).88State v. Page, 127 N. C. 512, 37 S. E. 66 (1900).
" State v. Manning, 221 N. C. 70, 18 S. E. (2d) 821 (1942) ; State v. Fain,
216 N. C. 157, 4 S. E. (2d) 319 (1939) ; State v. Burgwvyn, 87 N. C. 572 (1882).
88 State v. Hairston, 222 N. C. 455, 22 S. E. (2d) 885 (1942) ; State v. Harris,
222 N. C. 157, 22 S. E. (2d) 229 (1942) ; State v. Perry, 212 N. C. 533. 193 S. E.
727 (1937) ; State v. Gosnell, 208 N. C. 401, 181 S. E. 323 (1935).8' State v. Hardee, 83 N. C. 619 (1880) ; State v. Graham, 68 N. C. 247 (1873).
00 State v. Patrick, 48 N. C. 443 (1856).
81 State v. Graham, 68 N. C. 247 (1873).
'8 State v. Davis, 63 N. C. 578 (1869). 9-175 N. C. 200 (1876).
* LL.B., University of North Carolina, February, 1945.
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Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to Electric Eye Doors
The recent North Carolina case of Watkins v. Taylor Furnishing
Co., Inc.,1 held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply where
a customer was injured by a "magic eye" door in defendant's store.
Plaintiff entered through the left side of the double door opening, the
door, being partially open, suddenly closed catching the plaintiff between
it and the door frame. The applicability of res ipsa loquitur to in-
juries sustained by customers in stores is raised by this case and the
following discussion will be limited to such problem.
A storekeeper owes an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition for the
protection of business visitors.2  In the absence of the proprietor's
actual knowledge of the alleged defect, it must appear that he was con-
structively notified of its presence, i.e., that it existed for such a time
before the accident as to have become apparent if reasonable care had
been exercised in inspecting the premises.8 Such a failure to inspect,
or a failure to repair discoverable defects, constitutes negligence. On
the other hand, the defendant storekeeper is not the insurer of the safety
of those who enter his store for the purpose of making purchases.
4
As prerequisite to the invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
the courts have established the following rules: (1) The instrumental-
ity producing harm must be such that in the ordinary course of events
no injury would result unless from a negligent construction or user.5
(2) The apparatus must have been in the control and/or management
of the party charged with neglect at the time of the injury., It has
been held that this refers to the right of control, rather than actual
control, at the time of the negligence complained of.7  Thus the mere
1224 N. C. 674, 31 S. E. (2d) 917 (1944).
'Todd v. S. S. Kresge Co., 303 Ill. App. 89, 24 N. E. (2d) 899 (1940) ; Sher-
lock v. Strouss-Hirshberg Co., 132 Ohio St. 35, 4 N. E. (2d) 912 (1936).
Rankin v. Brandies & Sons. 135 Neb. 86. 280 N. W. 260 (1938); Pratt v.
Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 218 N. C. 732. 12 S. E. (2d) 242 (1940).
'Hulett v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 Mich. 59, 299 N. W. 807 (1941);
Pratt v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 218 N. C. 732, 12 S. E. (2d) 242 (1940);
Fox v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 209 N. C. 115. 182 S. E. 662 (1935) ; Sherlock
v. Strouss-Hirshberg Co., 132 Ohio St. 35. 4 N. E. (2d) 912 (1936).
'John v. McGinnis Co., 37 Cal. App. 176, 99 P. (2d) 323 (1940); Wiedanz
v. May Dept. Store Co., - Mo. App. - , 156 S. W. (2d) 44 (1941) ; Springs
v. Doll, 197 N. C. 240, 148 S. E. 251 (1929) ; Sherlock v. Strouss-Hirshberg Co.,
132 Ohio St. 35, 4 N. E. (2d) 912 (1936); Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R. I. 151,
158 Atl. 720 (1932).
' Olson v. Swan, 203 Cal. 206, 263 Pac. 518, 58 A. L. R. 129 (1928); Home
Public Market v. Newrock, 111 Colo. 428, 142 P. (2d) 272 (1943) ; Todd v. S. S.
Kresge Co., 303 Ill. App. 89, 24 N. E. (2d) 899 (1940) ; Nichols v. Korbritz, 139
Me. 256, 29 A. (2d) 161 (1942) ; Wiedanz v. May Dept. Store Co., - Mo. App.
- , 156 S. W. (2d) 44 (1941); Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C. 240, 148 S. E. 251
(1929); Benjamin v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 62 Ohio App. 83, 23 N. E. (2d) 447
(1939); Sherlock v. Strouss-Hirshberg Co., 132 Ohio St. 35, 4 N. E. (2d) 912
(1936).
'Hart v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo. App. 312, 118 S. W.
(2d) 509 (1938).
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possibility that some third person might have been responsible for the
negligent condition does not prevent the rule from applying, because
the doctrine is founded on probabilities, not mere possibilities.s In most
of the cases both of these requisites are present, but courts apply the
doctrine when only one is found to exist. In combination with one or
both of these conditions is found a third explanation for the application
of res ipsa loquitur: That the defendant possesses superior knowledge
or means of information as to the cause of the occurrence than does
the plaintiff.'
The doctrine is not a substantive rule of law; rather, it is a rule of
evidence, permitting the jury, in most jurisdictions, to draw an infer-
ence of negligence, which the defendant is always entitled to negative,
and if he fails to do so takes the risk of an adverse verdict.10 If two
reasonable inferences are deducible from the same facts, one of which
points to the negligence of the defendant and another to a different
cause, the doctrine is inapplicable, else, it is said, "a jury is called upon
to enter the field of speculation."-"
The courts agree that the mere fact of an invitee falling on the floor
of a store does not of itself raise the inferenc6 of negligence on the
part of the storekeeper. 2* To recover in such instance the injured
party must prove by competent evidence some actionable negligence of
8 Ibid.
'Takashi Kataoka et at. v. May Dept. Store Co., et al., - Cal. App.
139 P. (2d) 25 (1943); Wiedanz v. May Dept. Store Co., - Mo. App.
156 S. W. (2d) 44 (1941).
10 Galbraith v. Smith, 120 N. J. L. 515, 1 A. (2d) 34 (1938); Sherlock v.
Strouss-Hirshberg Co., 132 Ohio St. 35, 4 N. E. (2d) 912 (1936).
" Farina v. First Nat. Bk., 72 Ohio App. 109, 51 N. E. (2d) 36 (1943) (The
doctrine only applies when the facts admit of a single inference-that the accident
would not have happened unless the defendant had been negligent).
12* F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Ney, 239 Ala. 233, 194 So. 667 (1940) (Plaintiff
slipped on banana peel in aisle of store. Held: The Plaintiff is under the pri-
mary duty to show that the injury was proximately caused by the negligence of
the storekeeper, or one of its servants or employees.) ; Dalton v. Steiden Stores,
Inc., 277 Ky. 179, 126 S. W. (2d) 155 (1939) (Plaintiff stumbled over weather
stripping and fell. Held: Must show that defect could have been discovered by
reasonable inspection.) ; Hulett v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 Mich. 59, 299
N. W. 807 (1941) (Plaintiff slipped on oily floor. Held: To establish liability
there must be evidence that the floor was improperly oiled.) ; Rankin v. Brandies
& Sons, 135 Neb. 70, 280 N. W. 260 (1938) (Plaintiff slipped on soapy substance
on floor. Held: This raises no presumption of negligence, but what constitutes
due care of the storekeeper should be determined from the surrounding circum-
stances.); Pratt v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 218 N. C. 732, 12 S. E. (2d)
242 (1940) (Plaintiff slipped on greasy floor. Held: Defendant was not insurer of
safety of those who entered the store and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not
applicable.); Fox v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 209 N. C. 115, 182 S. E. 662
(1935) (Plaintiff slipped when she stepped on beet lying on the floor. Held:
Must establish actionable negligence of the defendant.) ; Parker v. Great Ati. &
Pac. Tea Co., 201 N. C. 691, 161 S. E. 209 (1931) (oily floor); Bowden v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 198 N. C. 559, 152 S. E. 625 (1930) (oily floor) ; Reay v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., Inc., 154 Pa. Super. 119, 35 A. (2d) 558 (1944) (oily
floor) ; Martin v. Miller Bros. Co., 26 Tenn. App. 110, 168 S. W. (2d) 187 (1942).
For further collection of authorities on this point see Notes (1919) 5 A. L. R.
282, (1924) 33 A. L. R. 181, 197.
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the defendant.' 3 Nor was the rule allowed to be extended to cover a
case where the plaintiff stumbled over a plainly visible scale platform
as she was leaving defendant's store,' 4 or where plaintiff, busily en-
grossed in conversation with another lady, stumbled over a stool in the
store's aisle,'5 * or where plaintiff was run into by a small boy on a tri-
cycle, the store having tricycles for sale.16* Also refusing to allow the
doctrine to be availed of where defendant's control is lacking, the Cali-
fornia court in Bartholomai v. Owl Drug Co. et al. said: "The mere
fact that the fire occurred is insufficient to raise an inference of negli-
gence on the part of defendants."' 7 In that case defendant was having
some welding done by a contractor and fire broke out causing plaintiff's
injuries.
There has been, however, some difference of opinion in applying the
doctrine to those cases where a chair in which the customer is sitting
suddenly collapses. In Kilgore v. Shepard Co.'3 it appeared that a leg
of the chair in which plaintiff sat was out of its socket and suddenly
collapsed. The Rhode Island court ruled that res ipsa loquitur did not
apply, saying that the control over the chair had been assumed by the
plaintiff."1* But the Missouri 20 and Texas21 courts have repudiated
the doctrine of the Kilgore case. Thus where a chair in which plaintiff
sat collapsed, having been procured for her by a clerk of defendant, it
was held that the customer had a prima facie case against the store.
2 2 *
Likewise in the case of Clark-Daniels, Inc. v. Deathe et al.23* it was
held that res ipsa loquitur was in order where a chair in which plaintiff
was sitting collapsed because of the absence of a vital screw. It is sub-
= Ibid.
Burckhalter et al. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 340 Pa. 300, 16 A. (2d) 716
(1941).
2-,* Sherlock v. Strouss-Hirshberg Co., 132 Ohio St. 35, 4 N. E. (2d) 912
(1936) (The court was of opinion that this stool was not within the exclusive con-
trol of defendant, and that it could have been placed in this position by some of
the customers as easily as by an employee of defendant.).
J0* Barnes v. J. C. Penny Co., 190 Wash. 633, 70 P. (2d) 311 (1937) (It is
necessary for the injured party to prove that the instrumentality causing the in-
jury was, at the time thereof, in the exclusive control of defendant.).
' 42 Cal. App. (2d) 38, 108 P. (2d) 36, 39 (1940).
1852 R. I. 151, 158 Atl. 720 (1932).
"0* Accord, Mineo v. Rand's Food Shops, Inc., - Misc.-, 32 N. Y. S. (2d)
23 (1941) (Court conceded that defendant was constructively in control of the chair,
but said that there should be exclusive control. There was also the feeling on
the part of the court that defendant had only limited opportunity for inspection.).
- Herries v. Bond Stores, 231 Mo. App. 1053, 84 S. W. (2d) 153 (1935).
"1 Clark-Daniels, Inc. v. Deathe et al., 131 S. W. (2d) 1091 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939).
2* Supra note 19 (The court distinguishes between this and the Kilgore case,
which was stated to be in a minority, in that the clerk in the former case offered
the chair to plaintiff, while in the latter case there was no clerk present and the
plaintiff moved the chair six inches and sat down.).
.3, Supra note 20 (The court attempts to distinguish this from the Kilgore
case by stating that in the former there was a defect not apparent to the casual
observer, while in the latter such was not the case.).
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mitted that the proposition expounded in the latter decisions is more
reasonable, for the storekeeper has an "overall" control of chairs pro-
vided for his customers and he could have discovered any defects by
reasonable inspection; whereas the injured customer was not in a posi-
tion to inspect for hidden defects.
The application of the doctrine would seem to be clear in those cases
involving injuries sustained by falling objects. It is usually held that
res ipsa loquitur is available when the object is within the control of
defendant and would likely not have fallen had there been due care
exercised by the latter. Thus in Benjamin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
2 4
plaintiff was permitted to invoke the doctrine where he was injured by
a falling advertising sign which had been resting on a narrow ledge
over a stairway.25* Closely allied to this situation and presenting a
striking analogy is the case of Nichols v. Korbritz.26 There plaintiff,
while standing in the center of the store, was struck in the eye by a
meat hook which, for some unexplained reason, had traveled from an
open refrigerator along a track on the ceiling extending into the center
of the store. The court said that, since this instrumentality was within
the control of the defendant and the injury would not likely have hap-
pened had the latter exercised due care, res ipsa loquitur applied.
2 7
Likewise where a customer falls through a defective trap door, not hav-
ing been apprised of its presence, 28 or an unguarded cellar stairway,
29
the doctrine has found favor with the courts.
The principal case seems to be one of first impression, but upon
analogy and comparison with the prerequisites for the application of
the doctrine and with those cases which immediately follow dealing with
swinging doors, it is apparent that the North Carolina court reached
the logical result. In a recent Illinois case3" the plaintiff's intestate was
about to enter defendant's store through a swinging door which was
partially open. When she came within one foot of the entrance the
door swung towards her, and in an effort to ward off a certain collision
therewith, she lost her balance and fell. The evidence tended to show
that several other persons had preceded intestate and had gone through
this same door, accounting for its being partially open at this time. It
was held that res ipsa loquitur did not apply. This case is represent-
ative of those where the injured party or some third person in fact
-462 Ohio App. 83, 23 N. E. (2d) 447 (1939).
2 * Accord, Perry v. Stein et al., - Mo. App. - , 63 S. W. (2d) 296
(1933) (Where a shelf in a store collapsed throwing canned goods on plaintiff.) ;
Gailbraith v. Smith, 120 N. J. L. 515, 1 A. (2d) 34 (1938) (Chandelier fell on
plaintiff.).
' 139 Me. 256, 29 A. (2d) 161 (1942).
27 Ibid.
"8 John v. McGinnis Co., 37 Cal. App. (2d) 176, 99 P. (2d) 323 (1940).
2" Lynch et al. v. Gatteguo, - Misc. -, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 337 (1939).
" Todd v. S. S. Kresge Co., 303 Ill. App. 89, 24 N. E. (2d) 899 (1940).
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had control of the agency, and the accident might have resulted from
one of several causes, for some of which the defendant would not be
liable 3 1* When a customer places himself within range of a swinging
door, he subjects himself to the probability of being hit by it if someone
has just passed through it. It would be unreasonable to conclude that
the storekeeper was in exclusive control of such an instrumentality.
The reasoning of these cases apl)lies to the facts of the recent North
Carolina case.3 2 Could it be fairly said that the storekeeper in the in-
stant case was in exclusive control of the opening and closing of the
"magic eye" door, when such door is known to remain motionless until
the light beam between the electric eyes (which cause the door to oper-
ate) is broken by an incoming or outgoing patron? The ptoposition
expressed in the swinging door cases above, i.e., that third persons are
in control of the door rather than defendant, would seem to apply to
cases of doors operated by the magic eye.
In the instant case a railing separated ingoing and outgoing cus-
tomers. The right hand door was marked "IN" and there was a rope
on the outside of the left hand door to indicate that it was not the en-
trance. The plaintiff's carelessness in not keeping to the right and
using the door marked entrance presents an inference of negligence
which would also preclude the application of the doctrine. It is sub-
mitted that the Supreme Court reached the correct result.
JAMES G. HuDsoN, JR.
Wills-Acts Constituting Election
In the recent case of Perkins v. Isley' testatrix devised all her prop-
erty to defendant and appointed plaintiff as executor. Plaintiff was
declared mentally incompetent, and defendant requested the clerk of
court to appoint an administrator c. t. a. The administrator was ap-
31* Olson v. Swan, 203 Cal. 206, 263 Pac. 518, 58 A. L. R. 129 (1928) (The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable in case of injury to a patron of a
store by the rebound of a swinging door when she was holding its companion open
for another customer to pass through, where the equipment is standard and in-
cludes checking devices.); Home Public Market v. Newrock, 111 Colo. 428, 142
P. (2d) 272 (1943) (Plaintiff was injured by the breaking of a glass panel in
swinging door under pressure of his hand.) ; Wiedanz v. May Dept. Store Co.,
- Mo. App. - , 156 S. W. (2d) 44 (1941) (Where plaintiff, attempting to
enter defendant's store through revolving door, was knocked down by a woman
hit by the door which was pushed by a man, it was held that there was no proxi-
mate cause as to the defendant.) ; Farina v. First Nat. Bk., 72 Ohio App. 109, 51
N. E. (2d) 36 (1943) (Patron departing from bank was injured by collapse of
revolving door. It was held that res ipsa loquiltur did not apply.). But cf. Crump
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 313 Ill. App. 151, 39 N. E. (2d) 411 (1942)
(The store's door was equipped with a plunger door check, and plaintiff was struck
by the metal bar of the door which had been held open by the door stop but sud-
denly closed as customer entered the store. it was held that res ipsa loquitur was
applicable.).
" Supra note 1.
1224 N. C. 793, 32 S. E. (2d) 588 (1945).
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pointed and entered into the duties of office. Three months later de-
fendant filed a petition renouncing her rights under the will and alleging
that she wished to take by intestate succession along with the plaintiff,
her brother. In an action for partition instituted by plaintiff's guardian,
the defendant contends that her renunciation amounted to a conveyance
made without the written assent of her husband. The jury found the
plaintiff and defendant to be tenants in common. On appeal the court
sustained this holding, saying that defendant was under no obligation
to make an election and her request to appoint an administrator c. t. a.
did not estop her from renouncing her rights under the will. But de-
fendant did make a valid renunciation of her rights under the will by
filing the petition with the Clerk of Court. Such a right is a natural
one and needs no statutory authorization.
An election under a will consists of the exercise of a choice offered
the devisee of accepting the devise and surrendering some right of his
which the will undertakes to dispose of, or of retaining such right and
rejecting the devise. The choice is compulsory between two inconsistent
rights or claims where there is a clear intention of the testator that the
beneficiary shall not enjoy both ;2 but it must appear that the testator
intended an election to be made before the acts of the devisee will con-
stitute an election.2 ' As applied to a will, the doctrine simply means
that one who takes under such will must conform to all its legal
provisions.3
There may be an election either (1) by express declaration showing
the intention of electing, or (2) by implication. If the election is by
express declaration, little difficulty is experienced in determining whether
an election has been made. It is where the election is impliedly made
that the difficulty lies. Since election is based on the intention of the
parties, testator and devisee, it is difficult to lay down set rules as to
what constitutes an election; rather the facts of each particular case
control.
In the first place, a devisee is entitled to know the condition of an
estate before making an election.4 Therefore, an agreement to abide by
a will made without sufficient knowledge on which to base an intelligent
judgment as to the best course to pursue will not estop a widow from
making a later dissent.5 Furthermore, a devisee must know an election
is necessary in order to be bound by acts which ordinarily would con-
stitute an election.6 Especially is this true where the other parties
'Wright v. Wright, 198 N. C. 753, 153 S. E. 321 (1930); Note (1937) 110
A. L. R. 1317: EAToN ox EQurrY (2nd ed. 1923) §65; 28 R. C. L., WILLS, §361.
'Ian re O'Rourke's Estate, 106 Vt. 327, 175 Ati. 24 (1934).
'McGehee v. MeGehee, 189 N. C. 558. 127 S. E. 684 (1925).
'See Richardson v. Truby, 250 Ill. 577, 580, 95 N. E. 971, 973 (1911).
'Richardson v. Justice, 125 N. C. 409. 34 S. E. 441 (1899).
'Johnson v. Ellis, 172 Ga. 435, 158 S. E. 39 (1931); Wible v. Ashcraft, 116
W. Va. 54, 178 S. E. 516 (1935).
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affected by such election can be placed substantially in the same posi-
tion as if there had been no election.7 * But once a valid election is
made, there can be no dissent.8
Under the older cases dower was a favorite of the law, and the
courts were quick to overlook acts which would usually constitute an
election under ordinary circumstances in an effort to provide for the
widow.9* Too, at common law there was a presumption of the accept-
ance of the most beneficial estate.:'
An implied election to take under a will can be shown in many ways.
Foremost is a failure to dissent from the will. In those states having
statutes controlling election, usually a limited time is allowed for the
widow to dissent;" and a failure to dissent within the time prescribed
estops the widow from electing to take dower.12 * Election in such fash-
ion operates in the nature of estoppel or on the basis of laches.'8 Too,
an election made by a failure to dissent from a will is a personal one,
7*Ludlum v. Roth, 126 N. J. Eq. 556, 10 A. (2d) 648 (1940); Waggoner v.
Waggoner et al., 111 Va. 325, 68 S. E. 990 (1910) (Widow held property belong-
ing to her husband's estate in ignorance of the fact that if she took under the will
she would relinquish her rights to other property. Held, to be no election.).
' Pirtle v. Pirtle, 84 Kan. 782. 115 Pac. 543 (1911).
'* Ramsour v. Ramsour, 63 N. C. 231 (1869) (Widow had conveyed land in
payment of her personal debts.). But see Shuette v. Bowers, Com'r of Int. Rev.,
32 F. (2d) 817 (1929) (Where a husband willed his entire property to his wife
and she sold part of the realty without an admeasurement of dower, such act con-
stituted an election. It is to be noted that this is a tax case which raised the
question of a deduction allowed for the widow's dower rights under the estate
tax.).
"0 Merrill v. Emery, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 507 (1830) ; Yawger's Ex'r v. Yawger
et al., 37 N. J. Eq. 216 (1883).
"ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 61, §§18-21; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 176,
§37; FLA. STAT. ANN. (1944) tit. 41, §731.33; GA. CODE ANN. (Park, Skillman,
Strozier, 1936) §37-502 through §37-504 (legatee), §113-819 (widow) ; ILL. REv.
STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 41, §§10-13; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933)
§6-2332 through §6-2336; IowA CODE (1939) §12007-12011; KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. (Corrick, 1935) §§22-245 to 22-248; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. (Cullen, 1942)
§392.080; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 89. §13, §14; MD. ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939)
art. 93, §314; MASS. ANN. LAWS (1933) c. 191, §15; MicH. STAT. ANN. (Hen-
derson, 1938) §§26.234-26.235; MINN. STAT. (Henderson, Kennedy & Scott, 1941)
§525.191; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1942) §325-330; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. (An-
derson & McFarland, 1935) §§5819-5820; NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) §30-107, §30-
108; N. H. REv. LAWS (1942) c. 359, §§10-14; DECEDENT ESTATE LAw (N. Y.)
§18(7); N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §30-1 to §30-3. §31-42; OHIo GEN. CODE ANN.
(Page, 1937) §10504-56 to §10504-58; OREGON Comp. LAWS ANN. (1940) §17-113,
§17-114; PENN. STAT. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §264, §265; R. I. GEN. LAwS (1938)
c. 556, §21; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) §§8358-8364; UTAH CODE (1943)
§101-1-4; VT. PuB. LAwS (1933) §2965; VA. CODE (1942) §5246; WiscoNsiN
STAT. (1941) §231.13.
12* Collins v. Carman's Ex'r, 5 Md. 503 (1854) (Statute required renunciation
within six months, and widow lived on the land for four years.) ; Moore v. Gor-
don, 85 N. J. Eq. 150, 95 At. 983 (1915) see Lee v. Giles, 161 N. C. 541, 77
S. E. 852 (1913).
13 Cox v. McBroom, 155 Kan. 2, 122 P. (2d) 185 (1942); Williams v. Camp-
bell, 85 Kan. 631. 118 Pac. 1074 (1911) ; Collins v. Carmen's Ex'r, 5 Md. 503
(1854) ; Hoggard v. Jordan, 140 N. C. 610, 53 S. E. 220 (1906) ; In re Wilson's
Estate, 297 Pa. 348, 147 At1. 70 (1929) ; Appeal of Jackson, 126 Pa. 105, 17 Ati.
535 (1889).
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and the executor or administrator of a deceased widow cannot dissent
therefrom.
14
But what affirmative acts constitute an election? Clearly, mere con-
sent to the probate of a will does not amount to an election to take
under it.15 In North Carolina, at least, the qualification as executor or
executrix does not amount to an election ;16 but once the will is offered
for probate by the executor with full knowledge of his rights there-
under, there can be no later dissentY* Still, if such acts are made with-
out knowledge of the condition of the estate, if a dissent is made imme-
diately upon discovery, the North Carolina court has held it to be
valid.18*
Where election is provided for by statute,19 it has been held that a
strict compliance with the statute is essential ;20* and acts which would
otherwise constitute an election have no bearing on the case.
21*
Such acts as constitute an election must be clear and unequivocal,
and must clearly evince an intention to take under the will.2 2  Hence,
the acceptance by a widow of a "family allowance" provided for by
statute and granted by the court "until further order" is merely a tem-
porary provision for the widow's support, pending administration of
the estate, and does not constitute an election.23  Bare statements by a
widow that certain legatees would take something under a will alone
will not constitute an election. 24  Neither does the fact that a widow
signed her husband's will, consenting to its terms, estop her from dis-
senting later.25 Furthermore, mere occupancy of the family residence,
which the widow is entitled to do until her allotment of dower-in and
of itself-does not constitute an election.2 6 This is especially true where
there has been no occasion which calls for her assertion of it.2
' Note 13, supra.
McGrath v. Quinn, 218 Mass. 27, 105 N. E. 555 (1914).
In re Shuford's Will, 164 N. C. 133, 80 S. E. 420 (1913).
* Treadway v. Payne, 127 N. C. 436, 37 S. E. 460 (1900) (Here the devisee
assumed the duties as executor and offered the will for probate. The court held
him estopped to elect later and accept the same property under a deed executed
by the testator subsequent to making the will.) ; Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 53 N.
C. 287 (1860).
28, Simonton v. Howton, 78 N. C. 408 (1878) (Widow had served as executor
for sixteen months.)." Note 11, supra.
20* Williams v. Williams, 114 Fla. 733, 154 So. 835 (1934) (Statute required
widow to dissent from will within one year after its probate. Therefore, the
fraudulent act of her attorney in failing to file her dissent did not prevent the
operation of the statute.).
1* Bullock v. Smith, 201 Iowa 247 207 N. W. 241 (1926) (Statute required
written notice of consent to will. Where a widow occupied the premises during
her lifetime and gave no written notice, she made no election.).
22 Merchant's Nat. Bank v. Hubbard, 222 Ala. 518, 133 So. 723 (1931).
"' Dick v. Glenn. 218 Ind. 282, 31 N. E. (2d) 1009 (1941),
2' Note 22, supra.
;'Tavel v. Guerin, 119 Fla. 624. 160 So. 665 (1935).
20 Note 22, supra.
',Archer v. Barnes, 149 Iowa 658, 128 N. W. 969 (1910).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The filing of a suit by a widow and the heirs of a testator to set
aside a testamentary trust as invalid does not constitute a dissent from
the provisions of the will within the statutory period.28 On the other
hand, the Virginia court has held that a widow who acted as executrix
- of her husband's will, was not estopped to dissent therefrom merely be-
cause she unsuccessfully contested a claim of deed of trust indebtedness
on her husband's estate. 29 Neither would a widow's request to with-
draw administration of her deceased husband's estate be construed as a
renunciation to take under his will where she actually possessed the
property.30 But where the action at law'results in an absolute assertion
of title under the will, there is indicated an intention to make an elec-
tion.8 1 Furthermore, an election against interest conferred by the will
may result in the same decision.32*
As indicated above, few singular acts on the part of the devisee or
legatee will result in an election; but add together two or more of the
above or similar acts, and usually the courts hold a valid election to
have been made.3s*
In the principal case the court held that there was no obligation on
the part of the defendant to make an election, and the mere fact that
she requested the appointment of an administrator c. t. a. was insuffi-
dent to estop her from renouncing her rights under the will. But she
did make a valid renunciation of her rights under the will by the filing
of the petition with the Clerk of Court, which clearly and unequivocally
set out her intention. It is submitted that the decision of the court is
correct.
CECIL J. HILL.
28 Story~v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. in Orlando, 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101
(1934).2 Liverman v. Lloyd, 159 Va. 565, 166 S. E. 475 (1932).
30 Peter v. Peter, 343 Ill. 493, 175 N. E. 846 (1931).
"Davis v. Badlam, 165 Mass. 248, 43 N. E. 91 (1896).
32* Smith v. Furnish, 70 Cal. 424, 12 Pac. 392 (1886) (Suit for services ren-
dered to a testator is an election not to claim a legacy in payment of said services.).
s'* McWorther v. Green, 111 Ark. 1. 162 S. W. 1100 (1914) (Wife held an
estate by the entirety with her husband. He devised the whole property to his
son in consideration that his son support his mother for life. The mother lived
with the son uhtil her death without claiming any interest in the land and with
the knowledge that the son claimed it under the will. These acts precluded the
heir of the mother from asserting any title in the property.) ; Appeal of Baker's
Estate. 170 Okla. 595, 41 P. (2d) 640 (1935) (Widow's acts in offering her hus-
band's will for probate, consenting to act as executrix, giving notice to creditors,
filing inventory, paying bequests, seeking credit therefor in her account, filing and
having the court approve her final accounts, and exonerate her bond-all without
dissatisfaction with the will, constituted an election to take under the will.) ; In
re Melot's Estate, 231 Pa. 520, 80 Atl. 1051 (1911) (Husband as executor of his
wife's will filed an account in which he claimed credit for money paid for his
wife's funeral expenses as provided by will; he also asked the court to distribute
in exact accordance with provisions of the will, which excluded a legacy to him-
self. The court held this to be an election.) ; Borden v. Ward et al., 103 N. C.
173, 9 S. E. 300 (1899) (Use of property and conveyance thereof constituted an
election.).
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